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Article 2

TORT LIABILITY OF CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS
There is much confusion and apparent conflict among the
cases passing on the question of the liability of a charitable
corporation for the negligence or torts of its officers, nurses,
physicians and employees.
Preliminarily, it may promote the discussion if we were to
make an analysis of the legal principles inextricably connected with the basic inquiry of this note.
It may be stated as a general rule, that the master or principal is liable to third persons for the torts of the servant or
agent, even though the conduct of the servant, or agent, was
without the participation, consent, or knowledge of the master or principal, provided the breach of duty arose from the
scope of employment, and was not a wilful departure from it.
Private corporations are, in general, liable for injuries arising from the negligence of their agents or officers, in the
course of their employment, in the same manner and to the
same extent as private individuals; for it is a settled maxim
of the law, founded upon the highest obligations of social
duty, that everyone shall so use his own, and so prosecute his
lawful business, as not, by his negligence, or want of care, to
injure others; and he cannot divest himself of this obligation
by committing its control to another.
So, municipal corporations are liable for injuries to third
persons resulting from the negligence of subordinate officers
and agents, acting under their authority and direction in the
construction of public improvements belonging to such corporations.' But municipal corporations are not liable for
negligent acts of their officers or agents while -in the discharge
of their political or governmental functions as branches of
the state or sovereign power.2
I
2

City of Kokomo v. Loy, 185Ind. 18, 112 N. E. 994 (1916).
City of Kokomo v. Loy, op. cit. supra note 1.
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Coming to the specific question as to what are charitable
corporations or institutions, it may be advisable to enumerate
in a general way some of the tests for determining whether a
corporation is charitable or not. The only true test of the
nature of an institution is its origin and objects. Charitable
corporations are such as are constituted for the perpetual
distribution of the free alms of the founders of them, to such
purposes as they have directed. Of this description are hospitals for the maintenance of the poor, sick or impotent, and
schools or colleges for the promoting of piety and learning.
Since the discussion will be devoted mainly to the specific
question of the exemption of charitable corporations from
liability for negligence of their agents and employees, we
must not fail to know that, as a general rule, "A corporation,
the object of which is to provide a general hospital for sick
and insane persons, having no capital stock nor provision for
making dividends or profits, deriving its funds mainly from
public and private charity, and holding them in trust for the
object of sustaining the hospital, conducting its affairs for the
purpose of administering to the comfort of the sick, without
expectation or right on the part of those immediately interested in the corporation to receive compensation for their
own benefit, is a public charitable institution." I And the
fact that a corporation, established for the maintenance of a
public hospital, by its rules requires of its patients payment
for their board according to their circumstances and the accommodation they receive, that no person has individually a
right to demand admission, and that the trustees of the hospital determine who are to be received, does not render it a
public charity. Where it is determined that the inntitution is
3 McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep.
529 (1876) (Ikeadnote, 21 Am. Rep. 529). Accord: McInerny v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n of Duluth, 122 Minn. 10, 141 N. W. 837, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 548
(1913); Stonaker v. Big Sisters Hospital, 116 Cal. App. 375, 2 Pac. (2d) 520
(1931); Higgons v. Pratt Institute, 45 Fed. (2d) 698 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1930); St.
Vincent's Hospital v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N. E. 537 (1924); Jordon v.
Touro Infirmary, 123 So. 726 (La. App. 1922); Johnson v. City Hospital Co.,
196 N. C. 610, 146 S. E. 573 (1929); Wallwork v. Nashville, 147 Tenn. 681, 251
S. W. 775 (1923).
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a charitable institution and is otherwise held to be exempt
from liability to beneficiaries, it has been held that the institution is not made liable by receiving pay from the injured
patient or recipient of the institution's services; in other
words, it does not affect the merits of the case one way or the
other with regard to whether the patient is a "pay" patient
or a "free" patient.
Coming to the specific question of the exemption of charitable corporations from liability for negligence of their officers, agents and employees, we find a great diversity of reasoning and adjudication in the numerous decisions in various
states.
The modern weight of authority tends towards the holding
that a charitable organization is not exempt from liability for
injuries negligently inflicted upon strangers by its officers,
agents and employees. 4
The court in Basabo v. Salvation Army I says:
"This court is of the opinion that both upon reason and authority,
so far as the cases directly apply to the case at bar, the defendant
corporation, although it is a charitable corporation, is liable as any
other corporation, for injuries to third persons caused by the negligence
of its servants and agents in the care and management of its horses
and teams while employed for its purposes, even though it is not
shown or alleged that there has been any lack of care or diligence on
the part of the defendant in the selection or retention of such servants
or agents. We believe that public policy does not require any such
exemption from liability as is claimed by the defendant in this case,
but, on the contrary, that such exemption would be contrary to true
public policy. We are clearly of the opinion that the true legal relation of master and servant existed between the defendant and the
4 Alabama Baptist Hospital Board v. Carter, 226 Ala. 109, 145 So. 443
(1932); Phoenix Assur. Co. v. Salvation Army, 83 Cal. App. 455, 256 Pac. 1106
(1927); Cohen v. General Hospital Soc. of Connecticut, 113 Conn. 188, 154 Atl.
435 (1931); Daniels v. Rahway Hospital (New Jersey), 160 AtI. 644 (N. J.
1932); Marble v. Nicholas Senn Hospital Ass'n of Omaha, 167 N. W. 208 (Neb.
1918); Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation, 203 N. Y. 191, 96 N. E. 406,
38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 481 (1911); Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati v. Duvelius, 123
Ohio St. 52, 173 N. E. 737 (1930); Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 R. I. 22, 85
Atl. 120, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1144 (1912); Hospital .of St. Vincent of Paul, v.
Thompson, 81 S.E. 13, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1025 (Va. 1914).
5 Op. cit. supra note 4.
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drivers in its employ at the time of the alleged injury; and that, just

as such a servant has the right to recover his stipulated wages for
breach of his contract of service on the part of his master, so also
would he be entitled to recover for injuries due to the negligence of
master as in other cases of master and servant. It would, in our opinion, be manifestly unjust and contrary to public policy to hold that
a person run over and injured on a public highway by a horse and
wagon belonging to the defendant, and driven by the defendant's
servant, through the negligent acts of such servants, would not be entitled to recover against the master, but could only recover against
the negilgent servant, while a person injured under similar circumstances by the servant of an expressman, or the driver of a cab belonging to a livery man, would be allowed to recover against the master."

There are, however, cases holding contrary to the Rhode
Island case on the liability of the charity toward strangers
and which grant complete exemption to the charitable corporation.6
In Foley v. Wesson Memorial Hospital7 the court held,
"That a public charity conducting a hospital is not liable for
negligence of its employees in driving its ambulance against
a pedestrian. The court says it is forcibly urged by counsel
that this exemption of a charitable institution from liability
for negligence of its servants should not be extended to cases
where the injury is inflicted on a stranger. But under the
Massachusetts doctrine that these trust funds cannot be used
to compensate wrongdoing committed by agents of those
that minister the funds, there is no ground of distinction between liability to a patient and liability to a stranger. If, as
a matter of public policy, there now should be a modification
of the law of the commonwealth exempting charitable organ6 Fordyce v. Woman's Christian Nat. Library Ass'n, 75 Ark. 550, 96 S. W.
155, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 485 (1906); Jackson v. Atlanta Goodwill Industries, 167
S. E. 702 (Ga. 1933); Simon v. Pelouze, 263 Ill. App. 177 (1931); Webb v.
Vougbt, 127 Kan. 799, 275 Pac. 170 (1929); Foley v. Wesson Memorial Hospital, 246 Mass. 363, 141 N. E. 113 (1923); Loeffler v. Trustees of Sheppard &
Enoch Pratt Hospital, 130 Md. 265, 100 Atl. 301, L. R. A. 1917D, 967 (1917);
Fire-Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. St. 624, 15 Atl. 553, 1 L. R. A. 417 (1888);
Gamble v. Vanderbilt University, 138 Tenn. 616, 200 S. W. 510, L. R. A. 1918C,
875 (1918); Bachman v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n, 179 Wis. 178, 191
N. W. 751, 30 A. L. R. 448 (1922).
7

Op. cit. supra note 6.
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izations from liability for negligence of its servants, such
change must be made by the legislature."
In our opinion it seems that the better view is expressed by
the majority of cases, which hold that a charity is not exempt
from liability for injuries negligently inflicted upon strangers.
The modern tendency of the law is to shift the burden from
the innocent victims to the community at large. The better
recent cases hold that charitable institutions, public and private, are on the same basis as other corporations and individuals as to the liability for negligence to those who are not
beneficiaries of the charities. For the considerations of public policy that preclude a patient in a charitable hospital from
recovering compensation for the negligence of a servant when
due care has been exercised in the servant's selection do not
preclude a stranger from recovering compensation for damages caused by such negligence. The court in Sisters of Charity v. Duvelius8 said:

"No valid reason is apparent for granting immunity to a charitable
institution for the negligence of its servants, and for placing the entire
responsibility for an injury upon innocent third persons and their
families. Charitable institutions are frequently conducted upon a large
scale, with all modem conveniences and appliances of a highly complicated nature, which enormously increase the risk of injury to operatives and strangers, and any doctrine of complete exemption would
lead to carelessness, neglect, and injury to both Derson and property.
While such institutions should be encouraged, and those who are charitably inclined should likewise be encouraged to support them, this encouragement should not be carried to the point where injustice will
be done to others."

Coming next to the question of the tort liability of charitable institutions for injuries to its own agents or employees
through negligence in the performance of some duty owing to
them, we find a great diversity of reasoning and adjudication
in the numerous decisions in various states. One line of cases,
apparently the greater number, holds that these organizations are not exempt from such liability to its own hired
8

Op. cit. supra note 4.
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servants and employees.' In the Mclnerny v. St. Luke's
HospitalAssociation"0 it was held that the failure of a charitable association to fulfil the duty imposed upon a master to
cover or guard dangerous parts of machinery, which duty
was absolute and nondelegable rendered it liable to its servants and employees who were injured in consequence of neglect to comply with the provisions of the statute; the court
saying if public policy requires that such associations be excluded from the operation of the statute, it should be so
declared by the legislatures, and not by the dictum of the
courts. The court further says that, under the modern trend
of judicial oDinion, a failure to discharge a nondelegable duty
creates, in the absence of express statutory exemption, a liability on the part of associations of this kind; and the court
in reaching a conclusion of liability says:
"Our view is that the duty created by law for the protection of
servants is absolute, and no employers should be exempt therefrom,
except by action of the legislature. No n)ublic good can come from Dermitting one charitable corporation, by the failure of a duty imposed by
law, to maim and disfigure its servants and employees, when depending
upon the nature of the iniury, their future welfare must of necessity
be looked after by some other charitable association, public or private,
or by already overburdened or poverty striken relatives and friends.
No such situation should be brought about by an arbitrary rule of
immunity from liability, applicable only to one class of persons, unless deemed by the legislature necessary to the existence and life of
charitable associations"

On the other hand, however, another line of cases holds
the charitable organizations are wholly exempt from liability
for such negligence towards its own agents and employees."
9 Bruce v. Central M. E. Church, 147 Mich. 230, 110 N. W. 951, 10 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 74 (1907); Geiger v. Simpson M. E. Church, 174 Minn. 389, 219 N. W.
463, 62 A. L. R. 716 (1928); Hewett v. Woman's Hospital Aid Ass'n, 73 N. H.
556, 64 At]. 190, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 496 (1906); Hordern v. Salvation Army. 199
N. Y. 233, 92 N. E. 626, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 62, 139 Am. St. Rep. 889 (1910);
Cowans v. N. C. Baptist Hospital, 197 N. C. 41, 147 S. E. 672 (1929); Lincoln
Mem. Univ. v. Sutton, 163 Tenn. 298, 43 S. W. (2d) 195 (1931).

10 Op. cit. supra note 3.

11 Emery v. Jewish Hospital Ass'n, 193 Ky. 400, 236 S. W. 577 (1921); Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. 147, 78 N. E. 855, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 481, 118 Am.
St. Rep. 484 (1906).
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In Farriganv. Pevear " the plaintiff, a servant of the defendant charitable corporation, was directed by his superior servant to work in a pit in close proximity to the exhaust from a
gasoline engine by the fumes from which he was injured. The
court ruled for no liability upon the ground that public officers are not liable for the misfeasance of their servants, saying:
"The reason for this rule is that acting for the benefit of the public
solely in representing a public interest, whether by a municipality or
by a public officer, does not involve such a peculiar interest as lies at
the foundation of the doctrine of respondeat superior. While such officers may well be held liable-for their personal negligence it would be
unreasonable and harsh to hold them responsible for the negligence of
their servants or agents. There would seem to be in principle no sound
distinction between an action for negligence by which personal injuries have been received, directly instituted against the charity by the
person injured, where its corporate form renders such procedure possible or expedient."

Our conclusion is that the corporations administering a
charitable trust, like all other corporations, are and should be
subject to the general laws of the land, and cannot, therefore,
claim exemption from responsibility for the failure of the
charitable corporation to discharge a nondelegable duty to
its own agents and employees and such duty renders it liable
to its agent and employees who are injured in consequence
of such neglect.
We come now to the cases that deal with the question of
the liability of charitable institutions for torts of agents
where the person injured through the negligence of the agent
or employee was a beneficiary or a recipient of the charity.
The rule is well-settled that a person who receives an injury
from acts of the servants of a charitable corporation, at a
time when he is accepting the benefits of the charity, cannot
recover for such injury, providing the corporation used due
care in selecting its agents and employees.13
Op. cit. supra note 11.
13 Stonaker v. Big Sisters Hospital, 116 Cal. App. 375, 2 Pac. (2d) 520
(1931); Morton v. Savannah Hospital, 148 Ga. 438, 96 S. E. 887 (1918); Nicholson v. Atchison T. & S. F. Hospital Ass'n, 97 Kan. 480, 155 Pac. 920 L. R. A.
1916D, 1029 (1916); Olander v. Johnson, 258 Ill. App. 89 (1930); St. Vincent's
12
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It must be observed that, although the courts are all practically agreed upon the rule of law applicable, there is much
disagreement as to the reason for the rule.
For example, some courts have based the rule of nonliability to a beneficiary upon the theory that the funds of charitable institutions are held in trust for charitable purposes, and
may not be used or diverted to payment of damages arising
from the wrongdoing of those who administer them. 4 Other
courts predicate the rule of nonliability upon the theory of
an implied agreement on the part of the beneficiary not to
hold the charity liable for injuries which he may receive at
the hands of the servants. 5 Other courts allow no recovery
to the beneficiary upon the theory of the nonapplicability of
the doctrine of respondeat superior, which doctrine is based
upon the theory that the principal not only derives a benefit
from the services of the employee or agent for whose negligence he is held liable but also exerts complete power of control over the activities of the employee; and, therefore the
doctrine can have no application where the service of the
employee is for the benefit of humanity, and not for the gain
Hospital v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N. E. 537, 33 A. L. R. 1361 (1924); Bruce
v. Y. M. C. A., 51 Nev. 372, 277 Pac. 789 (1929); Miss. Baptist Hospital v.
Moore, 156 Miss. 676, 126 So. 465, 67 A. L. R. 1106 (1930); Hamburger v. Cornell University, 240 N. Y. 328, 148 N. E. 539 (1925); Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati v. Duvelius, 123 Ohio St. 52, 173 N. E. 737 (1930); Gitzhoffen v. Sisters
of Holy Cross Hospital Ass'n, 32 Utah 46, 88 Pac. 69, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1161
(1907); Warton v. Warner, 75 Wash. 490, 135 Pac. 235 (1913); Bishop Randall
Hospital v. Hartley, 24 Wyo. 408, 160 Pac. 385, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 1172 (1916).
14 Brown v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n, 274 Pac. 740 (1929); Ettlinger v.
Trustees of Randolph-Macon College, 31 Fed. (2d) 869 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929);
Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill. 381, 75 N. E. 991, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.)
556 (1905 ; Emery v. Jewish Hospital Ass'n, 193 Ky. 400, 236 S. W. 577 (1921);
Kidd v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, 237 Mass. 500, 130 N. E. 55
(1921); Greatrex v. Evangelical Deaconess Hospital, 261 Mich. 327, 246 N. W.
137, 86 A. L. R. 487 (1933); Adams v. University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675,
99 S. W. 453 (1907); Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. St. 254, 75 Atl.
1087, 136 Am. St. Rep. 879 (1910); Lincoln Memorial University v. Sutton, 163
Tenn. 298, 43 S. W. (2d) 195 (1931).
15 Burdell v. St. Luke's Hospital, 37 Cal. App. 310, 173 Pac. 1008 (1918);
Paterlini v. Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 232 Fed. 359 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1916); Mikota
v. Sisters of Mercy, 183 Iowa 1378, 168 N. W. 219 (1918); Pepke v. Grace Hospital, 130 Mich. 493, 90 N. W. 278 (1902); Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital,
239 N. Y. 188, 146 N. E. 199 (1924), distinguished in Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N. Y. 163, 7 N. E. (2d) 28 (1937).
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of the institution which employs him; likewise, the true relation of master and servant does not exist between the institution and its medical staff because they are not under the absolute direction of the hospital, but they become and remain
the servants of the patients so long as they are in attendance
upon such patients.1 6 Still other courts deny liability upon
the broad ground of public policy, taking the view that, as
the institution is engaged in work highly beneficial to the
state, and to humanity, its funds ought not to be diverted
from this important purpose to the payment of private claims
for damages.7

All Of these theories have to a greater or less extent entered into the formulation of law which has now become wellsettled but not in my opinion too well-settled as to defy questioning and analysis. After a careful analysis of the opinions
dealing with the tort liability of charitable institutions to its
beneficiaries, we find that there are several distinct and wellgrouped cases. In the first instance we frequently come
across those cases in which a nurse or physician employed by
the hospital negligently injures the patient, and invariably
the verdict and judgment is in favor of the institution and
against the party injured. I am convinced the rule of law is
correct. In the first place nurses who are under the direction
of the superintendent, or are under the direction of the hospital physicians or surgeons, are not, in general, the agents
of the hospital in the true legal sense of the relation of mas-16 Deming Ladies Hospital Ass'n v. Price, 276 Fed. 668 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921);
Ratliffe v. Wesley Hospital and Nurses Training School, 135 Kan. 306, 10 Pac.
(2d) 859 (1932); Jordan v. Touro Infirmary, 123 So. 726 (1922); Roberts v.
Kirksville College of Osteopathy and Surgery, 16 S. W. (2d) 625 (Kansas City
Ct. of App. Mo., 1929); Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation, 128 App. Div.
214, 112 N. Y. S. 566 (1908) ; Betts v. Y. M. C. A., 83 Pa. Super. Ct. 545 (1924).
17 Lindler v. Columbia Hospital, 98 S. C. 25, 81 S. E. 512 (1914); Ettlinger
v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon College, 31 Fed. (2) 869 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929);
Butler v. Berry School, 27 Ga. App. 560, 109 S. E. 544 (1921); Emery v. Jewish
Hospital Ass'n, 193 Ky. 400, 236 S. W. 577 (1921) ; Jensen v. Maine Eye and Ear
Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 Atl. 898, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 141 (1910); Duncan
v. Nebraska Sanitarium & Benev. Ass'n, 92 Neb. 162, 137 N. W. 1120, 41 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 973 (1912); Weston v. Hospital of St. Vincent, 131 Va. 587, 107 S. E.
785, 23 A. L. R. 907 (1921); Magnuson v. Swedish Hospital, 99 Wash. 399, 169
Pac. 828 (1918).
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ter and servant, because as to the nature and manner of their
services, they are not under the direction of the hospital, but
they become and remain the agents of the patient so long as
they are in attendance upon such patients. Likewise when a
nurse is aiding and assisting the patient's physician in the
operating room, the nurse is the agent of the doctor and not
the servant of the hospital. Looking a bit further, we are
confronted by opinions in which the patient is injured by the
tort of a mere servant or employee functioning in that character. In a most recent opinion handed down by the Court of
Appeals Qf New York 8 the court laid down a rule of law that
sets a precedent that is fundamentally sound and judicially
logical. The plaintiff, who had been a paying patient in a
hospital of the defendant, a charitable corporation, was being
removed in its ambulance to her home. Negligence of the
driver brought the ambulance into collision with another vehicle, and the plaintiff suffered injuries. On these facts there
is squarely presented for the first time the question whether
a charitable institution (not in itself in default in the performance of any nondelegable duty) should be declared exempt from liability to a beneficiary for personal harm caused
by the negligence of one acting as its mere servant or employee. The court, after due deliberation of all the equities,
said that no conception of justice demands that an exception
to the rule of respondeat superior be made in favor of the
resources of a charity and against the person of a beneficiary
injured by the tort of a mere servant or employee functioning
in that character.
Underlying all the decisions, dealing with the subject matter at law, is the matter of public policy, and it is upon this
and the lack of a true master and servant relationship that
the rule of exemption may be said finally to rest. The theory
that trust funds are not to be taken under execution for the
torts of those who administer them rests, in the final analysis,
18 Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N. Y. 163, 7 N. E.
(2d) 28 (1937).
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upon the consideration of public policy, as does the holding
that the rule of respondeat superior shall not apply to the
nurses and physicians who are not, as a matter of fact, the
agents of the charity, rests in the final analysis, upon the
consideration that true legal relationship does not exist
between the charity and the doctors and nurses.
But, resting upon public policy, the rule rests upon a sufficiently firm foundation. A policy of the law which prevents
him who accepts the benefits of a charity from suing it for
the torts of its agents and servants, and thus taking for his
private use the funds which have 'been given for the benefit
of humanity, which shields gifts made to charity from the
hungry maw of litigation, and conserves them for purposes of
the highest importance to the state, carries on its face its own
justification, and, without the aid of metaphysical reasoning,
commends itself to the wisdom of mankind.
This rule should be applied unequivocably, at least where
one seeking to enforce liability against the charitable institution is one who has accepted benefits from it and has been
injured by the negligence of a nurse or physician or anyone
who was not functioning as a mere servant or employee.
Maurice M. Tulchinsky.

South Bend, Indiana.

